Maya Khachab
Soldiers of the Sudanese Armed Forces escort Darfur’s governor during a stopover in the eastern city of Gedaref. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have been battling the SAF for control of the country since spring © AFP/Getty Images
Sudan is currently facing the world’s largest displacement crisis. On April 15th, 2023, a
war broke out between the Government of Sudan or Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), after weeks of rising tensions. Fighting began in Khartoum and Darfur, forcing thousands of Sudanese to flee to nearby cities and expanded to other cities like Wad Madani.
This war did not start in a vacuum. In October 2021, General Burhan seized power through a coup d'etat and dissolved the Transitional Military Council, which was established after the Sudanese Revolution in April 2019, which overthrew then president, Omar al-Bashir, who gained power through a coup 30 years ago. In a power struggle for control, General Hemedti, deputy chairman under Burhan, tried to incorporate the RSF into the national army, which sparked a major war of destruction lasting almost a year now.
Over 13,000–15,000 Sudanese have died and 33,000 injured as of January 2024. Today, with only a few functioning healthcare facilities in combat regions, over 24.8 million Sudanese depend on humanitarian aid, 17.7 million suffer from acute hunger, 3.1 million are at danger of cholera and other diseases. Over 7 million Sudanese are internally displaced, and 19 million children are not in school. The hostilities have also damaged essential infrastructure and utilities, disrupting water supply, banking, financial services, energy, and telecommunications. 1.5 million have fled to Ethiopia, Egypt, or Chad. However, currency depreciation and inflation have already impoverished these countries. Financial aid is scarce, limiting refugees' capacity to access health care, education, and jobs and reconstruct their lives.
The international community failed to adopt a firm, objective stance against Sudan's military groups despite the urgency and severity of this issue. The UN has urged both military parties to negotiate a ceasefire without success. Financial and political constraints underpin these institutions' flaws. Because the UN does not have a standing army, it relies on member nations to provide soldiers to peacekeeping missions based on their national or political interests, limiting its direct enforcement capacity.
For example, the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan(UNITAMS) helped execute the Juba Peace Agreement (October 2020), which established a permanent ceasefire in Darfur. Supporting political change, democratic governance, and human rights was also stressed in this resolution. In December 2023, the Security Council passed Resolution 2715, immediately terminating UNITAMS at Sudan's request, citing the mission's failure to assist them after multiple coups, its main purpose, among other human security initiatives.
Reaffirming all previous resolutions and presidential comments on Sudan, Resolution 2715 emphasizes its strong support for Sudan's sovereignty, unity, independence, and geographical integrity. The resolution also calls for an immediate ceasefire, facilitation of humanitarian aid and access to combat regions, and a negotiated solution to Sudan's war. It also supports citizens who have fled Sudan and welcomes the Intergovernmental Authority on Development(IGAD), African Union(AU), and leadership diplomatic initiatives.
The UN, IGAD, and AU have been accused of "international dumping" by promoting peacekeeping, discussion, and sending representatives to regional bodies in crises without real actions or effective strategies, hampering the UN's ability to confront global threats. Sudan's government (SAF) suspended its IGAD membership because IGAD invited the RSF to appear at a summit meeting to mediate between warring groups. Sudan was first suspended from the AU because of the 2019 coup and ongoing political problems. The AU appointed a team of African ambassadors in January 2024 to work with the SAF, RSF, and civil society groups to restore constitutional order in Sudan, but no tangible action was taken.
Refusing to attend negotiation talks, Burhan, SAF leader, urged the international community to designate the RSF as a terrorist group and blacklist them. Even though the SAF is far from perfect, the majority of Sudanese identify them as the legitimate government representing all Sudanese, while the RSF represents one Arab tribe. Various sources accuse the warring parties of various crimes, but the most common perpetrator is the RSF. Merely calling for a ceasefire, without addressing the RSF's war crimes, is ineffective and leaves civilians vulnerable to further violence.
Before its dissolution, the Transitional Military Council was established to integrate forces as part of a transition from military rule to civilian democracy. For this process to be restarted, international organizations and nations must strongly condemn the RSF’s numerous human rights abuses, including terrorizing and looting civilian homes, sexually abusing women and girls, holding civilians at gunpoint, and the occupation of hospitals and many other public facilities. There must be international pressure on the RSF to vacate occupied public facilities, ceasing their assaults on the Sudanese people.
International organizations must enforce credible threats against the RSF by going beyond superficial punishments like visa denials. Without harming civilians, the Security Council can apply targeted economic sanctions (“blacklists”) on RSF leaders and financial supporters to freeze their assets and block their access to global financial institutions.
The international community, particularly regional powers, should leverage their power to impose stringent conditions on the RSF, ensuring they withdraw from civilian areas and cease hostilities. A worldwide arms embargo targeting the RSF would limit their access to weapons and ammunition but its success depends on enforcement and international arms suppliers' cooperation. The Security Council, Arab League, and other organizations must pressure the UAE to stop funding, supplying, and equipping the RSF. Their backing for the RSF militia violates foreign territory sovereignty and international law and must be stopped.
National security opposed sending U.S. troops to Sudan because it would entangle them in a conflict they have no business in. Direct U.S. interference in international conflicts has been detrimental, so the U.S. could work through regional proxy powers if it chooses. Nations can assist Sudanese refugee agencies financially, evacuate their citizens from the country, and provide aid; the U.S. is the biggest donor to Sudan and should increase funds.
Providing assistance, intelligence, and possibly non-lethal aid to the Sudanese state or other local forces opposing the RSF to safeguard citizens and civilian infrastructure could undermine the RSF's influence and capacity to operate unchecked. A coordinated diplomatic campaign to isolate the RSF, including suspending diplomatic ties or negotiations that legitimize them, could increase international pressure on them to comply. Legal accountability may inhibit further abuses, so courts like the ICC should investigate and indict RSF officials for war crimes or crimes against humanity.
However, directly challenging the RSF's rule would be a major escalation and require international support, which has been lacking. This plan effectively combines direct action and diplomacy to halt hostilities, rebuild Sudanese livelihoods, support refugees, and ensure a long-term democratic political process.
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