The Fall of the Assad Regime: A Turning Point for the Axis of Resistance and Regional Stability

Mariana El-Khouri

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad Speaking with the Press (Via: independentco.uk)

The Assad regime, which has ruled Syria for 54 years, has finally collapsed as opposition forces liberated the country through a decisive offensive. Celebrations erupted nationwide as fighters freed prisoners from Sednaya Prison, north of Damascus, and other detention centers across Syria. Cries of joy echoed throughout the streets as “witnesses reported jubilation in the capital, with chants of ‘Freedom! Freedom!’ heard in a main square.” With the news of the regime’s downfall spreading like wildfire, opposition fighters “entered the heart of the capital, announcing a ‘new era’ free of revenge and inviting Syrians overseas to return.” For many, Assad’s fall signified the end of decades of authoritarian rule and the possibility of a new democratic era. However, while this victory marked a turning point for Syria’s future, it also created deep uncertainty, particularly in the broader regional balance of power.

While Assad’s removal marks a new chapter for Syria, offering its people a chance to redefine their nation and government, it also leaves behind a dangerous power vacuum. What does this mean for the Axis of Resistance? The fall of the Syrian regime would weaken this regional alliance by severing Iran’s key supply routes, limiting Hezbollah’s operations, and reducing Tehran’s strategic depth. However, it could also force a shift toward asymmetric warfare, with Iran and its allies relying more heavily on militias and proxy networks to maintain influence. Without a stable Syrian regime to facilitate Iran’s military and financial aid to its proxies, Tehran would need to restructure its regional strategy, creating ripple effects across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

For years, Syria has been a cornerstone of Iran’s regional power, serving as a vital land bridge for funneling money, fighters, and weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon and other proxy groups. This logistical network has enabled Iran to exert pressure on its adversaries, particularly Israel while maintaining strategic depth. The fall of Assad’s government would dismantle these supply lines, forcing Iran to seek alternative routes through Lebanon or Iraq, both of which are less secure and more vulnerable to external disruption. Additionally, Hezbollah, which has long relied on Syria as a safe zone for training operatives and stockpiling weapons, would face operational constraints, limiting its ability to expand its influence in Lebanon or engage in cross-border conflicts with Israel. A weaker Hezbollah would not only shift power dynamics in Lebanon but could also embolden Israeli military operations against the group, further straining Iran’s regional influence.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Iran has invested billions of dollars and deployed military advisors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to sustain Assad’s rule. Hezbollah has also played a direct role, sending thousands of fighters to combat opposition forces. Yet, despite these efforts, Syria’s economy remains in ruins, and anti-regime sentiment persists, particularly in Sunni-majority areas that oppose Assad’s Alawite-led government. Moreover, Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria have significantly degraded their military infrastructure, exposing their ongoing vulnerabilities. If Assad’s government collapses, Iran’s heavy investment in Syria would be lost, and Hezbollah would be forced to refocus on Lebanon, where political and economic instability already threatens its standing. Given Lebanon’s worsening financial crisis and internal discontent with Hezbollah’s political dominance, the loss of Syria as a support base would place the group in a precarious position, forcing it to reallocate resources and reconsider its long-term strategy.

Rather than signaling the end of the Axis of Resistance, Syria’s fall could drive a shift toward more decentralized and asymmetric tactics. Iran has a history of adapting to geopolitical setbacks by doubling down on irregular warfare and proxy networks. If Syria ceases to be a viable base, Tehran is likely to increase its reliance on Iraq, where pro-Iran militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq remain active. It may also lean further on Hezbollah’s entrenched presence in Lebanon to sustain regional operations despite logistical challenges. Additionally, Iran has increasingly focused on drone and missile warfare, which could compensate for the loss of Syrian territory by allowing Tehran to project power remotely. The group's ability to adapt will determine how effectively it can sustain its role in the Axis of Resistance despite mounting pressure from both regional adversaries and internal divisions.

The collapse of Assad may be seen by the West as a strategic win against Iran, but it also introduces significant risks. Groups with extremist elements like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or surviving members of ISIS could exploit the instability in the absence of a centralized government in Damascus, intensifying violence in Syria and beyond. Furthermore, diplomatic attempts to create a stable post-Assad regime may be complicated by competition for influence between Turkey, Russia, and Gulf states. Turkey, which has long supported elements of the opposition, may push to expand its control over northern Syria, while Russia, despite losing its primary ally in Assad, could seek to maintain military and economic influence in the region. Meanwhile, Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, may attempt to shape Syria’s future leadership in ways that counter Iranian influence, further complicating an already fragile political landscape. The shifting environment may compel the United States and its allies to reassess their regional strategy, balancing efforts to curb Iran’s influence with the need to prevent greater instability in Syria.

Ultimately, the fall of the Assad regime represents both a crisis and an opportunity for regional powers. For Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it poses a significant setback, but their ability to adapt through asymmetric tactics and proxy networks will shape the future of the Axis of Resistance. Meanwhile, for the broader international community, the challenge will be ensuring that Syria’s transition does not create further chaos that fuels extremism or deepens geopolitical rivalries. As the region braces for this uncertain future, the consequences of Assad’s collapse will be felt far beyond Syria’s borders, reshaping the balance of power across the Middle East.